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Peter McCormick*

Structures of Judgment: How the Modern
Supreme Court of Canada Organizes its
Reasons

In recent decades, the Supreme Court of Canada has developed a distinctive
and unusual way of organizing its reasons for judgment; concomitantly, it has
developed a comparably distinctive style for its minority reasons as well. This
article describes this new decision format and the elements into which it is
typically divided, and compares it with the practices of appeal courts in other
common law countries. It concludes first by theorizing about the purpose and
the functions of decision formats and format changes, and then by defending the
current Canadian style.

Au cours des derni~res d~cennies, la Cour supreme du Canada a elabor6 une
fagon distinctive et inhabituelle de presenter ses motifs de jugement; elle a aussi,
simultan~ment, 6labore un style distinctif pour exprimer les motifs de la minorite.
L'auteur decrit le nouveau format des d~cisions et les diff~rentes divisions
de chacune; il les compare ensuite avec les pratiques qui ont cours dans les
tribunaux d'appel d'autres pays de common law En conclusion, il emet d'abord
une hypothese quant I'objectifet aux fonctions du format des d~cisions et des
modifications aux formats; il d6fend ensuite le style adoptd au Canada.
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Introduction
What does a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada look like? This
seems a rather innocuous question, and to those who follow the current
Supreme Court on a regular basis, it seems to have a very obvious
answer. I will demonstrate that both the question and the answer involve
more complicated considerations than would appear at first glance. The
"obvious" answer, as it turns out, is a recent contrivance, making its
current ubiquity all the more intriguing: continuity may sometimes be its
own justification, but change (especially pervasive and persisting change)
requires an explanation.
The question is not innocuous because the making and the justifying
of decisions is the entire work of the Supreme Court, its decisions the
only mechanism through which the Court exerts influence. This is the
fascinating paradox of judicial power, never more pointed than today. On
the one hand, as none can doubt in the age of the Charter, Canadian courts
in general and the Supreme Court in particular have considerable power,
a much greater impact on the flow of political events and the evolution of
public opinion and the development of public policy than their predecessors
could ever have dreamt (or, in most cases, would ever have wanted). On
the other hand, the judiciary is-as the stock phrase has it-the "weakest
branch," lacking its own bureaucracy or police force to enforce its decrees
or even to see if those decrees are obeyed. Even the judicial hierarchy
is a less reliable tool than one might think, because lower court judges
are principled professionals who also need to be persuaded, locating
themselves along a continuum between reticence (not to say resistance)
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and enthusiasm as they respond to those decisions.' Ultimately, the Court
has all the power that people think it is appropriate for the Court to have at
any given time, no less but no more; and it is through its written decisions
that the Court seeks to maintain or augment that power.
And the answer is not obvious because the Court has clearly changed
the format of its decisions in recent decades-the Supreme Court Reports
through the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s reveal an evolution in the way that
the Court explains itself, a change in form with substantive implications.
The current format seems transparent and routine today, but it was only
clearly established under Lamer; thirty years ago, a distinctly different
presentation style was similarly transparent, equally routine to its
contemporaries. The very fact that one can speak of a standard format is
an important consideration in its own right, refuting the fully plausible
response that there is no standard format, that the appearance of a Supreme
Court decision depends on the judge and the type of case and possibly a
number of other variables as well.
My purpose is to describe the modem decision-delivery format of
the Supreme Court of Canada-to identify its major elements and their
sequence, and the functions that each element performs within the broader
framework. Equally important, the emergence of a new standard format
for the judgment of the Court has been accompanied by the emergence
of a comparably standard appearance for minority reasons as well. To
an extent that was not true a few decades ago, the two sets of reasonsmajority and minority-now mesh in a new way as an institutional product
that tells a new story about what the Court does and how it sees its role. I
shall conclude by suggesting why the way the Court explains itself makes
a difference, and appraising the Supreme Court's new format in terms
of how it contributes to the Court's functions in this new century; in the
process, I will compare the modem Supreme Court format with that of
other comparable common law courts.
I. Doesformat matter?
One immediate objection might be that the format has nothing to do with
the real product of the Supreme Court, which is doctrine. Not the wrapping,
but the content, of Supreme Courtdecisions is what really matters, and it
would matter just as much if it were scrawled in point form on the backs
of envelopes. As all parents know, toddlers on Christmas day are likely
to play with the empty boxes or the wrapping paper, but it does not take
I. For an extended discussion of this, see Bradley C. Canon & Charles A. Johnson, Judicial
Policies: Implementation and Impact, 2 d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Books,
1998) passim.

38 The Dalhousie Law Journal

many years for them to learn that what really matters is what is inside.
Arguably, we Court-watchers should do likewise.
But even this homey metaphor can be unfolded to support my
point, because the wrapping is an important part of the package. Putting
something under the tree, wrapped in Christmas paper to make it part of
the season, wrapped in the first place to create a pleasant mystery and to
keep a secret, and sitting for some time to prolong the suspense: this is
quite different from casually handing something over in the bag from the
store, and saying "I thought you'd like this." Both are nice, to be sure, but
they are not the same thing.
Similarly with the courts-the packaging is part of the message, and
not an unimportant part. Leave any set of practices in place long enoughdecades, even centuries-and the original purposes may be taken for
granted, overlooked, even forgotten. But when the packaging is changed,
and in particular when it is changed suddenly and systematically, this must
have been done to serve a conscious deliberate purpose-if there were no
purpose, no reason at all, then continuity would be the more plausible
choice. I will demonstrate the abruptness and extent of the change shortly;
let me first defend the idea that the way that the Court organizes, presents
and packages its decisions is coherent and purposeful, relating to the role
of the Court and its relationship to other actors.
For example: consider the seriatim decision, the practice whereby
every member of a multi-judge appeal panel delivers a full free-standing
set of reasons, each writing as if nobody else were doing so, their "votes"
for and against the appeal being totalled to generate an outcome. To this
day, the English House of Lords usually delivers multiple sets of reasons,
many of them largely parallel; the United States Supreme Court famously
did so until John Marshall taught them the advantages of greater solidarity';
our Court delivered many seriatimjudgments until the 1920s and 1930s3 ;
and the High Court of Australia still delivers many seriatim decisions
today (especially in constitutional decisions).' To many, such a process
2.
See John V. Orth, How Many Judges Does it Take to Make a Supreme Court? (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 2006) esp. c.2 "The Secret Sources of Judicial Power" [Orth].
3.
For a discussion of the (declining) practice of seriatim judgments on the SCC, see Claire
L'Heureux-Dub , "The Length and Plurality of Supreme Court of Canada Decisions" (1989-1990) 28
Alta. L. Rev. 581 [L'Heureux-Dub6]. As far as I know, the last pure seriatim decision by the Supreme
Court of Canada was Hossack Estate v. Hertz Drive Yourself Stations of Ontario Ltd., [1966] S.C.R.
28.
4. See Matthew Groves & Russell Smyth, "A Century of Judicial Style: Changing Patterns in
Judgment Writing on the High Court 1903-2001" (2004) 32 Federal L. Rev. 255. See also Matthew
Lynch, "Report from Australia" The Court (Osgoode Hall Law School Lawlog, Law Blog) (24 April
2007), online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2007/04/24/report-from-Australia>, who observes that "the
High Court of Australia has always stated its decisions in seriatim."
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appears pointless, wasteful, and doubly inefficient. It is inefficient first,
because all the judges are busily drafting reasons thatwill, much of the
time, simply duplicate each other redundantly at what can be very great
length, covering the same ground and citing the same authorities to reach
the same conclusion, profligately squandering that most relentlessly finite
of appellate resources, judicial person-hours. It is inefficient second,
because one has to read all the reasons (or at least all those supporting
what becomes the outcome) in order to be sure that they simply duplicate
each other, and to be able to distinguish common ideas-which become
precedent by their commonality-from stand-apart solo suggestions-which
must be obiter.
The context which explains this now-curious practice is formalism,
the idea that for every judicial question there is a single correct answer,
for every statute or document a single objective meaning, which yields
itself to trained experts applying mechanical procedures under fixed
and clearly established rules.' With law as with mathematics, formalism
suggests, all professionals tackle any given problem in the same way,
generate the same answer by the same process, and explain both process
and answer in parallel terms; we can, the formalist says, demonstrate
the truth of this proposition by having five (or seven or nine) of these
professionals listen to the problem and then retire each to generate their
own answer.' The fact that they produce highly similar products vindicates
their professionalism; more importantly, it validates the objectivity and
the correctness of their separate and independent answers. We can think
of it as the judicial equivalent of the medical second opinion, save that
there are more than two opinions and they are simultaneous rather than
sequential. The seriatimjudgment is not only defensible; in the context of
formalism, it is the logical and transparently convincing way for a panel
appeal court to fulfill its role. The shared understanding of the nature
of the law and the role of the court directs and constrains the form-the
"packaging" and the presentation-of judicial doctrine.
For a second example: consider the decisions of a civilian appeal
court such as the Court of Cassation of France (also called the Supreme
Court of Appeal, which on its own website refers to itself as the Supreme

5. My discussion of formalism is based on Frederick Schaver, "Formalism" (1987-1988) 97 Yale
L.J. 509; using this to explain the seriatim style is my own idea.
6.
As John Orth intriguingly points out, even my assumption of an odd-sized panel is anachronistic
in this description, since it anticipates serious disagreement and works in advance to avoid any prospect
of the unfortunate confusion of a tie vote. In the world of the seriatim judgment, the expectation is
that the members of the panel will all agree, that disagreement will be rare (albeit unfortunate when it
occurs), and that close votes simply will not happen. See Orth, supra note 2, esp. ch. 1.
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Court of France). To someone familiar with common law Supreme Court
judgments, these are curious documents. They are rarely more than a
paragraph long, and often a short paragraph at that; they follow a rigid
formula with a string of "whereas" clauses, some flatly stating facts
and others identifying the appropriate section(s) of the relevant code,
culminating in a "therefore" that is the outcome and the remedy. They
lack the discursive argumentation we would expect to find to justify the
rejection of alternative outcomes or argumentative tracks, to explain to the
losers why they lost. Small wonder that a generation of comparative legal
scholars grew up wondering if these were really parallel equivalents to
common law decisions, or if there was something covert going on behind
the panel's brief, formulaic and invariably unanimous decisions.
But this, too, flows from the civilian understanding of the role of the
judge and the nature of the system. First, the codes are understood to
be simple and straightforward, comprehensive and easily understood,
unfolding their meaning in an objective and transparent fashion-hence
the mechanical flatness of the brief "whereas" clauses stating the law.
Second, it is neither expected nor desired that the judge should do anything
more than apply that flat objective meaning to the immediate facts;
imagination and creativity (even the act of interpretation) would involve
a discretionary judicial law-creating power that is completely repugnant
to the civilian system. Third, since judicial decisions are not supposed to
have any precedential value in the same or lower courts, there is no need
for expansive explanation. Again, the shared conception of the function of
the court directs the form of the decision.
We from the common law tradition might ask why there is no
consideration of alternative theories of the case (that is to say, alternative
explanatory frames which might so organize the facts as to direct different
outcomes and consequences), no consideration of the way that the allegedly
flat statements in the codes might be interpreted or worked off each other
to subtly alter their meaning, no discussion of the contextual circumstances
or the policy consequences of the different "spins" that might result from
either of these or their combination, no careful fitting of the immediate
case and decision into the broader and inevitably evolving framework of
the law and of the judicial understanding of that law. But in fact this
goes on all the time. The French process includes another official (ajuge
debout whose work supplements that of thejuges assis) whose job it is to
develop the documents on which the panel of judges bases their cryptic
formal decision, and those documents contain explanatory alternatives,
interpretive options and policy consequences galore. And the brief
formal decision is often accompanied simultaneously by, and printed in
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juxtaposition to, a scholarly commentary by a high-ranking law professor
which locates the immediate decision in the framework of other decisions
and commentaries, and subjects it to harsh criticism should it fail to fit. In
the common law world, we find all these elements in a single rhetorical
package, attributed to a specific judge and signed by enough colleagues
to constitute a majority judgment of the panel; but in the civilian system,
these are separate functions performed by different actors, and only some
are widely available.7
My basic point, then, is that the way that a panel appeal court presents
its decisions is not random or arbitrary epiphenomenon, but rather it
reflects an understanding by the members of the court of their role, of the
way they interact with other actors within the legal and judicial system.
Once the basic elements of that role and those interactive relationships are
understood, then the format of the decisions makes sense; indeed, it can
become utterly self-evident, such that one cannot imagine from within the
system how it could look otherwise. My present purpose is to perform a
similar analysis of the decision format of the Supreme Court of Canada.
II. The data-base
This discussion is based upon a consideration of the cases decided by the
Lamer Court and the McLachlin Court, including every written decision
handed down by the Supreme Court between 1 July 1990 and 31 December
2007. The initial intention had been to include the Dickson Court as
well, but this foundered on the fact that the Dickson Court is clearly the
transitional period, and it is only the two most recent chief justiceships
whose decision-delivery practices are so similar as to justify treating them
as a single set of decisions. The starting date of 1 July 1990 is therefore not
a matter of arbitrary choice but rather one that is dictated by the material:
what is described is a decision delivery style that has clearly dominated
the Court's written judgments since 1990, but that equally clearly did not
do so before that date.
Specifying "written judgments" explains why the numbers are
somewhat smaller than might have been expected. The Lamer Court
handed down almost one thousand decisions over the not-quite-a-decade;
but about a third of these were oral from-the-bench decisions, delivered
on the same day arguments were heard. Similarly, the McLachlin Court
as of December 2007 had handed down 592 decisions, but about oneMy description of the civilian system is based upon the account in Mitchel de S-O-L'E Lasser
7.
Judicial Deliberations:A ComparativeAnalysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004) [Lasser]; see also William D. -Popkin, Evolution of the Judicial
Opinion: Institutionand IndividualStyles (New York: New York University Press, 2007) [Popkin].
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sixth of these were oral from-the-bench decisions.8 As might be expected,
these were skewed toward appeals by right, skewed toward smaller panels,
skewed toward dismissed appeals, and skewed heavily toward very short
rather than extended reasons. Omitting these provides a better focus on the
critical question: when the Supreme Court has a decision that it wishes to
explain at some length to some broader public, how does it organize that
explanation? Oral decisions, by contrast, can often be justified in a single
paragraph-sometimes in a single formulaic sentence that can be as short
as a dozen words. ("The appeal is dismissed for the reasons given in the
court below.")
Narrowing the count to reserved decisions reduces the total number
of cases to 1166, of which 90.1% (89.6% for the Lamer Court, 90.8% for
the McLachlin Court) correspond to the "full format" described below. By
way of comparison, only a handful of the decisions of the Dickson Court
(and a striking 0% of the decisions of the Laskin court) follow the same
format. These numbers in themselves justify both the description of a new
standard format for Supreme Court decisions, and the suggestion that this
format has emerged recently in response to some specific consideration.
III. Caseloadandformat
Look at a set of Supreme Court reasons from its first decades, in the 1870s
or 1880s, and it is easily described: it is a single block of text. By "single
block" I do not suggest that it is not divided into paragraphs, or that the
flow of text is not interrupted by appropriately attributed direct quotations
(from statutes, from the lower courts, or from other judicial decisions);
indeed, my impression is that the proportion of quoted material is higher
for the early years than it has been since. But my point is that the text is
never divided into sections with headings that would permit a reader to
know when to skim and when to read closely.
Look at a set of Supreme Court reasons a century later, in the 1970s,
and they look much the same-still a single block of text, broken into
paragraphs and interrupted by quotations. The number of multiple sets
of reasons (especially the number of cases that approach seriatim form
with all or most of the members of the panel writing at comparable
length without any reference to each other) has fallen, and the reasons for
judgment have become somewhat longer, but the growth is actually rather
modest-only about two dozen reasons for judgment of the Laskin Court
8.
The shrinking fraction is interesting in its own right. For a more extended consideration of this
phenomenon, see Peter McCormick, "Compulsory Audience: Appeals by Right and the Lamer Court
1990-99" (Paper presented to the CPSA Annual General Meeting (Congress of Social Sciences &
Humanities, Toronto, June 2002)) [unpublished].
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exceeded 10,000 words in length, and a number of the early sets of reasons
by the Supreme Court approach this figure.
But look at a Supreme Court decision from any time after July, 1990,
and the chances are very high (90% of all reserved judgments) that it
will have a very definite and predictable form, one that I am calling "full
format." The first "pure" examples of this style occurred some time earlier,
at the very end of the Dickson Court. Lamer's reasons in R. v. Ross, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 3 almost qualify, although the single-sentence disposition is not
broken off into a separate labelled section, so perhaps a stronger candidate
is Gonthier for his reasons in Elsom v. Elsom, [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 1367, his first
substantive judgment for the Court. The ground broken, a string of other
examples of the model follows, authored by Gonthier, Dickson,9 Lamer,
Wilson and McLachlin. By 1990, these have ceased to be the exception
and have become the standard rule; now it is a departure from this format,
not the following of it, that has become unusual.
Lamer Court

McLachlin Court

Total

585 (89.6%)

464(90.8%)

1049 (90.1%)

Other format

17(2.6%)

7(1.4%)

24(2.1%)

Unformatted

51(7.8%)

40(7.8%)

91 (7.8%)

653

511

1164

Full format

Total:

The 90% figures inthe table validate my assertion of a standard format,
but it is still worth asking about the other 10%. Most of them (a
remarkably consistent 7.8% for both the Lamer and McLachlin Courts)
are the unformatted decisions reminiscent of the earlier- period, and the
major reason for the lack of format is obvious-they are very short. The
average unformatted decision is 1400 words long, about three pages of
text. One feels that there is sometimes morie going on than appears on the
surface-for example, when a case is granted leave, assigned to a full ninejudge panel, and judgment is reserved for over a year, it is curious to have
it decided unanimously with reasons less than 500 words long."° But if the
reasons are going to be so short, the lack of segmentation into formally
labelled parts is hardly surprising.
A significantly smaller number (2% overall, slightly more for the
Lamer Court but slightly less for McLachlin) are divided into labelled
9.
Although Dickson has a long series of decisions over the previous several years which differ
from my "full format" only because rather than having an "Analysis" section divided into sub-sections
with content-specific ad hoc labels, Dickson makes each of these a separate section.
10. See e.g. R. v. Smith, 2003 SCC 48 and R. v Mitchell, 2003 SCC 49.
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segments, but those do not follow anything resembling the full format
model that I am about to describe. The labels used in these cases are ad
hoc and content-specific-that is to say, they look more like the transitional
formats of the Dickson Court than the vast bulk of the decisions handed
down since. I had expected that many of these would be reference cases,
which do not always lend themselves to the standard format (although this
is less true of reference case appeals from provincial courts of appeal), but
these account for only fourof the twenty-four. A pair ofjudges (McLachlin
and Deschamps) account for more than a third of all the examples, but the
others were authored or co-authored by ten different judges; only eight
judges" have never written one. Public law cases are over-represented
with ten examples, Charter cases under-represented with two. There is no
on-the-surface explanation of why these cases were handled differently;
for my purposes, the point is that their numbers are very small.
IV. The 'fullformat" of Supreme Courtdecisions
After Lamer assumed the chief justiceship, the new "full format"
dominated. The new practice involved a number of separate segments
headed by generic labels, as shown in the table. The "frequency" column
demonstrates that this was something short of an automatic "cookie cutter"
approach; my point is not that every decision used every one of these
labels (although a rather impressive three hundred did), but that every
decision was organized around labels drawn from this set. There was a
certain degree of variation, but not to the extent of eclipsing the general
practice; sometimes the facts were folded back into the introduction, or
alternately sometimes the fact section was expanded to include the judicial
history. More recently, the statutes/constitution section has increasingly
been relegated to an appendix (especially if it is at all lengthy), although I
think it would be premature to drop this as a normal segment of the typical
decision.

11.

lacobucci, Stevenson, Wilson, Arbour, LeBel, Abella, Charron and Rothstein.
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Segment Label
Introduction

Frequency
96%

45

Average length
254 words

Facts

90%

822 words

Judicial History

78%

1056 words

Statutes/Constitution

54%

556 words

Issues

50%

.256 words

Analysis

96%

6312 words

Disposition

91%

116 words

Other

15%

1223 words

The table showing the most common elements and their average length
is deceptively straight-forward. For one thing, the labels for the standard
sections are obvious, even banal-expressed in generic terms, what other
aspects or elements would one expect to find? But part of my point is that
the use of generic labels is the novelty. The Supreme Court began with
undifferentiated blocks of text, a flow of words (broken into paragraphs
and interrupted by quotations) that was not divided into sections even on
those occasions, increasingly frequent into the 1970s, when the decisions
began to stretch to and past ten thousand words. Then, briefly during the
1970s, the text was sometimes broken into sections that were numbered
but not labelled, a curious step that seems to accomplish very little.' 2 Then
the text was broken into segments that carried content-specific labels, often
in the form of questions that the segment proceeded to answer. 3 The "end"
of the process (at least so far) is the division into segments with generic
labels, generic precisely for the purpose of fitting a wide variety of types
of cases.
It has always been the case that Supreme Court decisions usually
give us some elements of the factual background, often tell us about the
actions of the lower courts, and almost always give us an analysis which
provides substantive reasons for the outcome, finally concluding with the
disposition or outcome-but it has not always been the case that the Court
divided its decisions into segments that carried these explicit labels, or
that such a large proportion of the cases routinely included so many of the
elements.

12.
13.

See e.g. Dickson's reasons in Di Iorio v. Warden of the MontrealJail,[1978] 1 S.C.R. 152.
See e.g. Dickson's reasons in Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229.
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The "proportions" column indicates how many "full format" sets of
reasons include a segment with the indicated title or some minor variant
thereon. Since the format is used for a wide diversity of cases, variously
resolved in as little as a thousand or as many as 30,000 words, this is
only to be expected. What I am picking up on is the presence or absence
of the labelled segment, and I do not mean to imply that the material is
completely absent from the reasons; for example, if the "Background"
section concludes with a paragraph or two on the decisions of the trial and
appeal courts, my count would notice the absence of the labelled section
rather than the presence of the information. And because not all segments
are always present, the average lengths of course cannot be totalled to give
an average decision length without being prorated against the frequency
of their appearance.
Almost every case decided by the modem Supreme Court begins
with an "Introduction," usually labelled as such but sometimes simply
an unlabelled paragraph or two before the first labelled and numbered
section. These average about 250 words in length, or about 3% of the
length of the average set of reasons, although they have been showing a
tendency to get longer; the average introduction for the McLachlin Court
is about double the size (360 words, or 4.0% of the total) that it was for
the Lamer Court (170 words, or 1.8% of the total). Only six times for the
Lamer Court, but 21 times for the McLachlin Court, have they exceeded
1,000 words.
The second section (although sometimes the first numbered section, a
nicety I will ignore) is usually labelled "The Facts" (or "The Background"
or "The Factual Background"). These tend to be somewhat longer,
averaging just under one thousand words, or less than 10% of the total
length of the average reasons forjudgment. If the comments on the actions
of the lower courts are particularly brief, they may be folded in as the
last paragraph or two of this section. Not surprisingly, given the unusual
circumstances of such cases, the "outlier" on this score is a reference case
(Reference re EducationAct, [ 1993] 2 S.C.R. 511) which actually has two
consecutive sections both labelled "Background" and totalling over 8,000
words, almost one-third of the total; but this is very much sui generis, and
no other case remotely approaches it.
There is usually a third section labelled "Judicial History" (or "Actions
Below") which describes what has happened in the lower courts (and/or,
when relevant, in the board or tribunal which may have preceded the first
judicial involvement). These, too, average about 1000 words (10% of the
average total length), although they tended to be slightly longer for the
Lamer Court (1130 words) than they have been for the McLachlin Court
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(900 words). The wording tends to be very flat and neutral; even if later
sections of the decision depart from or criticize the analysis of the lower
courts, there is usually no indication of it here. The outlier here is R. v
Pires, 2005 SCC 66, in which the analysis is effectively folded back into
the judicial history section by being juxtaposed, segment by segment, to
what happened in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, but this again is
one of a kind.
In the full format, the next two sections are the "Relevant Statutes"
(and/or "Relevant Constitutional Provisions"), which are generally direct
quotations from the legal text, and the "Issues" (or "Questions"), which are
usually but not invariably questions explicitly set by the Court (usually the
chief justice) before oral argument. The statutory/constitutional material
averages about 550 words and the issues section averages about 250
words, the numbers staying constant for the two Courts. That said, these
two are the most optional of the sections in the full format; only about
half of all the formatted reasons use either of them. In recent decisions,
there has been a tendency sometimes to relegate the statutory material
to an appendix rather than to include it in the body of the decision text,
especially if the quoted material is rather extensive, but it would be going
too far to describe this as replacing the labelled segment completely.
Unsurprisingly, by far the largest part of the reasons deals directly
with the doctrinal issues, presenting the legal arguments that justify
the conclusion, and this section is usually labelled "Analysis" (or, less
frequently, "Discussion"). This was the last section of the standard format
to evolve; dozens of Dickson Court decisions use most of the standard
format, but then use content-specific labels for a string of numbered
sections that now would be sub-sections of a single Analysis section.
These average almost 7,000 words in length; put differently, they account
for fully 70% of all the words that are written in these reasons. Most of
them are divided into smaller sub-segments with non-generic headings;
and in some of the very long decisions, the sub-sections are themselves
further sub-divided into what can become very complex structures that
invite, but (at least within the time period considered) never receive, a
4
table of contents. 1
The final section gives the outcome, (or "Conclusion" or "Disposition"
or "Remedy"), usually in terms of what happens to the appeal itself (is it

14. Although more recently, the Supreme Court has in fact taken just such a step: the decision of
Rothstein J.(for a unanimous Court) in Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, 2009 SCC 9
represents the first time that a set of reasons has employed a table of contents laying out the structure
of the reasons and the paragraph number with which each section begins..
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allowed or dismissed), but sometimes in terms of what has happened to
the initial judicial decision, especially if awards or remedies have been
altered; it also sometimes speaks to costs. It averages just over 100 words;
indeed, I have the impression that sometimes the judges are engaged in
a private competition to see how low they can reduce the count for this
section, there being several dozen examples of laconic utterances with
word counts in the single digits. Very rarely, there will be two of these three
labels heading separate segments. The outlier here is R. v. Swain,'5 with an
extensive 8000-word conclusion following the 10,000-word analysis, but
this is highly unusual.
About one full-format decision in every seven includes all or most of
the labelled segments I have indicated, but inserts one or more additional
labelled sections as well. On average, when these additional segments
exist, they average about 1000 words in total (or about three pages of
text). Most of the labels are very content-specific rather than generic.
For example: "The Publication Ban"; "The Statutory Interpretation of
Section 70(6)"; "The Wiretap Issue"; "The Interveners"; "The Garafoli
Leave Requirement"; and so on. But there are two important exceptions
to this general observation, two distinct sets of "other" labelled sections
that are recurrent rather than unique and specifically tailored. The first
is generated by the presence of two or more separate sections from the
disposition/conclusion/outcome/remedy set; this happened on twenty
occasions. The second is the heading "Application [of the analysis] to the
immediate case," variations of which account for twenty examples; this
more commonly occurs as the last sub-section of the larger "Analysis"
section, but sometimes it is floated out on its own.
These section labels constitute the format around which the Supreme
Court of Canada has organized the delivery of its reasons in reserved
decisions since 1990. It is not quite an obligatory framework, as it if were
handed out on laminated sheets to all new appointees-this is demonstrated
both by the fact that 10% of all reserved decisions do not follow the format
at all, and by the fact that fully two-thirds of all reasons omit or combine
one or more of the "standard" labelled sections, or insert additional sections
on a largely case-specific basis. Still, there is a definite centre of gravity
to decision delivery that was not there for previous chief justiceships, and
this suggests a conscious shared decision to work toward an institutional
product.

15.

[1991] 1 S.C.R. 933.
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V. The SCCformat in a comparative context
It may seem that I have laboured mightily and brought forth very little.
The material covered in the standard format is obvious and unsurprising,
and the labels themselves border on the banal. After all, one might well
ask, if a Court were going to organize its reasons in terms of a standard set
of labelled segments, what else could they conceivably look like? But this
challenge fails; it misses the point in four different and important ways.
First, it assumes that there is some logical or functional or historical
imperative for a court to adopt a standard format for its judgments that
will be followed by all judges for all sorts of cases. But this is simply
not true. There is no compelling reason why such splendid individualists
as appeal court judges, experienced professionals with solid credentials
and constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence, should casually
and routinely surrender their own unique and principled conceptions of
an appropriate appearance for their reasons for judgment; nor is there
any compelling reason on the face of it why all types of law (Charter,
constitutional, public, criminal, private) in all types of cases (major- and
minor) should be assumed to call for the same format even when formats
of some type are indicated. The variety of types of cases, exacerbated by
the variety ofjudicial experiences and stylistic preferences, would suggest
instead a variety of formats. Forget for the moment the question of what
the format looks like; the first surprise is that there is a normal or standard
format at all, followed in 90% of all reserved decisions.
Second, it assumes that if there is a standard format involving the
division of ajudgment into segments, those segments must be labelled. But
this too is a conceptual leap that is supported by no compelling logic and
massively unsupported by.experience. Historically, when the unbroken
flow of text in Supreme Court of Canada decisions was first interrupted for
segmentation, this simply took the form of flat numbers (typically, Roman
numerals), devoid of any label to render more transparent the internal logic
of the segmentation. As suggested by examples from other countries (to
be discussed below), these numbered segments can be further sub-divided
into smaller segments that are similarly identified only by letters of the
alphabet, similarly lacking any labels of any sort. The decision to segment
is one thing, the decision to label another.
Third, it assumes that if there are to be labels attached to segments,
these labels must be generic rather than ad hoc and content specific. Again
historically, when the Dickson Court began to experiment with formats, it
initially worked with ad hoc content-specific labels, often in the form of
questions that the segment was directed to answering, alternatively in terms
of indicating specific sections of the legislation or specific cases in the
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precedential string that called for focused attention. The practice of appeal
courts in other countries similarly illustrates the sporadic attractiveness of
this logical alternative, and a certain (small) percentage of Supreme Court
of Canada decisions continue to respond to this impulse as well. The use
of generic and repetitive labels cannot simply be assumed; it represents a
further non-obvious non-determined choice among several alternatives.
Fourth, it assumes that the generic labels in the Supreme Court of
Canada's current standard format constitute the only available set of such
labels-but despite the obvious, even bordering-on-the-banal, appearance
of the labels, this is demonstrably false. As I will explain below, there is
another set of appeal courts in the world that has also adopted a "generic
labels" format that is frequently used, but this set of labels is both smaller
than the SCC set (excluding a number of the frequent elements) and
larger than that set (including one element that has not earned itself an
independently labelled segment in Canada).
Thus far, I have been primarily concerned with comparing the SCC's
current practices with its previous (pre-1984 and pre-1970) practices; I
now propose to support the above points by broadening the comparative
background to include a variety of modem common-law courts in
comparable countries.
Three Commonwealth courts
None of the three Commonwealth courts that I will consider have adopted
a standard format that is at all comparable to the Canadian style, or (for
that matter) a standard format at all.
The United Kingdom House of Lords (now the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom) is still characterized by a tendency toward multiple
judgments, with more than one judge from the panels of usually five
(sometimes seven) judges providing reasons. There is often a single
longer set of reasons that can be thought of as a lead or central judgment,
but it is usually accompanied by one or more sets of additional reasons,
sometimes dissenting but often concurring, and these are invariably
unformatted. There is no standard format. The most common style
involves an unformatted flow of text, unbroken by sections or labels of any
kind; the next most common involves a more-or-less standard start (facts,
proceedings) followed by ad hoc content-specific labels. A small number
of decisions are organized around reasons which identify a string of issues
raised in the appeal, dealing with each one in turn. In general, decisions
tend to be considerably shorter than those from Canada or the U.S.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is no longer (since
1949) the final court of appeal for Canada, but it continues in existence
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and acquired significant new jurisdiction with the devolution of authority
to Scotland and Wales. Its decisions usually take the form of a single
set of reasons attributed to a specific author, although (unlike the practice
when the Judicial Committee still heard appeals from Canada) minority
opinions are now not unheard of. The normal format, even for longer sets
of reasons, is an unformatted flow of text, with the occasional decision
using ad hoc content specific labels. Even more occasional (only a handful
of examples) is a format involving three generic labels (The Facts; The
Litigation; Conclusion), a style that is similar to that of the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal that will be discussed below.
The decision delivery practices of the High Court of Australia are
unusual in two respects. First, they tend to give seriatim decisions,
especially but not only in constitutional and public law cases-seriatim
meaning that each judge writes a full set of free-standing reasons as if
theirs was the only opinion being rendered by the Court. The seriatim style
still lingers for the House of Lords (although it is no longer the dominant
approach on that body), and it was followed on the USSC in the eighteenth
and on the SCC in the nineteenth centuries, but it has all but vanished
for both courts; it survives in Australia for a significant number of cases,
although it is by no means predominant overall. The second unusual
feature is that where a block of judges combine to deliver a majority (or
unanimous) judgment for the court, they often do not designate a lead
judge who will be the nominal author, but instead deliver a joint judgment
that is co-authored-putatively equally-by all the judges on the panel. 6
The text itself, however, usually follows the British practice in that
it is an unformatted flow of text, even when the reasons themselves are
extensive. A minority of cases (but not so small a minority as to make
it particularly unusual) use ad hoc content-specific labels to break the
text, but without any standard format. Further complicating things is the
fact that when the panel fragments, there is no set of majority reasonsa "judgment of the Court" in Canadian terminology, an "opinion of the
Court" in American terminology-that is specifically designated on its face
as carrying particularly authority, and there may be several sets of solo

16. It is almost certainly the case that actual practice falls somewhere between the two extremes
of single author and evenly-shared responsibility: in Canada there is a lead author (more rarely but
increasingly, lead authors) but the principle of circulating drafts and then accommodating critical
suggestions means that the final reasons are really something of a joint product; and in Australia it
seems unlikely that there is not a single judge who takes the responsibility of writing an initial draft
that will then absorb suggestions from all the rest. On the one hand, the Australian practice means
that we do not know who the lead author was; on the other hand, the Canadian practice obscures the
contributions of those other than the lead author.

52

The Dalhousie Law Journal

reasons of comparable length each with its own idiosyncratic set of ad hoc
labels.
American Courts
The United States Supreme Court is clearly the premier court in the
world for the modem model of judicial power, exercising the power of
judicial review in the context of considerable (but not unlimited) judicial
independence. It has never been the Canadian practice to follow, or even
to attach particular importance to, American practices and models, one
indication being the fact that English judicial citations continue even in
this new century to outnumber all American citations, let alone citations
to the USSC. It is therefore not particularly likely that the SCC would
simply emulate the USSC in its decision-delivery format, although it is
somewhat less unlikely in the last quarter century than it would have been
earlier.
The USSC has developed a distinctive and increasingly uniform format
for its reasons, fully described by Delson, on whose account I rely. 7 The
earliest examples of this format date back to the 1920s, and since the 1940s
it has become the standard format for all the opinions of the Court save
the shortest; the fact that it gradually rather than abruptly became the full
format suggests that this was a gradual conversion by example rather than
a focused decision by the full court or something more or less imposed
by a chief justice. Unlike the Canadian practice, the same format is also
frequently used for dissents and concurrences.
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court are divided into Parts
with roman numerals but no descriptive labels (either generic or ad hoc),
and these Parts are further divided into sub-parts identified by letters of
the alphabet, again without labels. On occasion, these sub-parts may be
divided even further under Arabic numbers or lower case Roman numerals,
again without labels. Other members of the panel may indicate agreement
or disagreement with the opinion in full or with specific parts and subparts, and this is outlined in the last paragraph of the official syllabus that
precedes every USSC decision."8 As a fairly typical sample (this one from
Republic ofPhilippinesv. Pimentel, No. 06-1204): "Kennedy, J., delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Thomas,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined, in which Souter, J., joined as to
all but Parts IV-B and V, and in which Stevens, J., joined as to Part II.
17. B. Rudolph Delson, "Typography in the U.S. Reports and Supreme Court Voting Protocols"
(2001) 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1203.
18. Official and invariable, but curiously not citeable-see Gil Grantmore, "The Headnote" (2002) 5
The Green Bag 157.
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Stevens, J., and Souter, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting
in part."
It is often the case that the "I" section could just as easily be headed
"Facts and Lower Courts" combining those two segments from the SCC
format; "II" is often the analysis of the arguments of the parties; and "III"
is often a short conclusion, but it would be a mistake to translate the "part"
system exclusively in these terms. For one thing, there are exceptions; for
example, in Riley v. Kennedy (No. 07-77, decided May 27 2008), Part I is
a legislative history and the facts of the immediate case are not found until
Part II. But the larger problem is that there are not always three and only
three Roman numeral-headed sections. In the recent decision in Boulware
v. United States (No. 06-1598, decided on March 3, 2008), Part I is ashort
and focussed discussion of the relevant legislation (relating to the income
tax and penalties for evasion), and it is Part II that deals with the facts
and the details lower court decisions. Part III (which one would initially
be tempted to label "Analysis") starts off with a Section A that looks at
a number of relevant precedents and the basic principles they establish,
a Section B that focuses on a major precedent (Miller) that is treated as
being rather dubious, and then a Section C that continues the critique
of Miller. And Part IV is not a conclusion, but'rather more analysis-a
consideration of the government arguments in the case-with Part V
providing a single paragraph conclusion ("vacate and remand"). Similarly,
in Snyder v. Virginia (Number 06-10119, decided March 19 2008), Section
I again gives the case background, but the analysis is divided between
Part II and Part III; the single-sentence conclusion is not given a Part
label, but is separated from the rest of the text by three centred asterisks.
Major cases can have even more parts-Hamdanv. Rumsfeld, (No. 05-185
June 29 2006) for example, had seven-but shorter ones can have as few
as two. My general point is that individual judges decide for themselves
when they have moved on to a new issue that deserves its own segment;
there is no implicit "'I' means such and such, 'II' means something else"
understanding that directs the segmentation. Similarly, when minority
opinions divide themselves into Parts, these have no connection to the
divisions of the majority opinion; Part II of a dissent does not match up
with Part II of the majority reasons. The United States Supreme Court has
a standard format, but it is very much a unique development that can be
opaque and puzzling to outsiders.
The US CircuitCourts of Appeal
There are thirteen Circuit Courts of Appeal in the United States, eleven
numbered circuits each with appellate jurisdiction over the federal district
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.courts in two or more states, plus the District of Columbia Circuit and
a special Federal Circuit. Strictly speaking, they are not comparable to
the other courts that I have been discussing, since they are intermediate
courts of appeal rather than national high courts, and therefore this last
comparison should be taken with the appropriate grain of salt. Partly in
the interests of brevity, but even more because the variations between the
circuits are relatively modest, I will be dealing with all the circuit courts as
a single block, rather than working through the circuits one at a time. My
comments relate only to published decisions, not unpublished decisions
(or, to use the somewhat different terminology used by some circuits,
precedential decisions and not non-precedential decisions) for those
circuits where this distinction is indicated up front.
There is no single standard format for circuit appeal court decisions,
neither for the thirteen circuits taken as a group nor for any of the circuits
considered separately. Instead, the recent decisions of these courts take
four different forms, with the proportions varying somewhat from one
circuit to another. The first form is the most obvious one, consisting of
unformatted flow-of-text reasons. These are of course more common for
the shorter decisions, but they are not restricted to this type alone. The
Seventh Circuit,' 9 for example, contains some of the most highly regarded
appeal court judges in the country (Posner and Easterbrook), and they
often use the unformatted style even for very extensive reasons. A second
type of reasons (generally the least common) uses a numbered format that
imitates that of the United States Supreme Court. Given that this is the high
court in the judicial pyramid within which the circuit courts of appeals are
the intermediate appeal courts, some degree of emulation is only to be
expected, but it is perhaps surprising that it accounts for such a small share
of the total; the proportion seems to be highest in the D.C. Circuit" and
the Fourth Circuit. 2' The third type of reasons (and generally the second
least common) uses ad hoc labelled segments, where the title signals the
content of the ensuing section, sometimes in the form of a question.
But there is a fourth type of sets of reasons, used by every one of
the circuits and generally the second most common, that is particularly
relevant to the topic that I am exploring These reasons are divided into
three numbered sections after a short introductory paragraph; the first
section is labelled THE FACTS (more rarely THE BACKGROUND) (the

19. Including Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, with sixteen judges.
20. With jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, and with fifteen judges.
21. Including Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia, with nineteen
judges.
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all-caps are used in every circuit except the First22); the Second is labelled
DISCUSSION; and the third is labelled CONCLUSION. Only in the Ninth
Circuit, 23 and only about half the time, there is a fourth section labelled
STANDARDS OF REVIEW before the Discussion section.
Conclusions re comparison
The brief survey of Commonwealth and American courts makes my
general points. First, it is usually not the case that there is a standard
decision format generally followed by all judges of the court for all casesthis is true only of the Supreme Court of Canada and the United States
Supreme Court. Second, it is not necessarily the case that even modern
courts always or even usually divide decisions into segments, at least for
the longer sets of reasons; again, this is only true of the Supreme Court
of Canada and the United States Supreme Court. Third, it is far from
common practice for western appeal courts to use standard generic labels
for segments when they occur; this is true only for the Supreme Court of
Canada and (on a more occasional basis) the U.S. circuit courts of appeal.
Fourth, although the U.S. circuit courts of appeal are the only other courts
regularly to use generic labels, they do not use the same set of generic
labels as the Supreme Court of Canada, but a consistently and distinctly
different set.
VI. Minority reasons
But the judgment of the Court is not the whole story; more than half of
all reserved decisions of the Court involve one or more sets of minority
reasons, either dissents (disagreeing with the outcome) or separate
concurrences (differing in whole or in part with the reasons that the
majority has presented for that outcome). 24 Particularly intriguing is the
fact that at the same time that the Supreme Court was inventing a style and
format for the judgments of the Court, it also developed a style-also rather
different from that of previous chief justiceships-for the presentation of
these minority reasons. If the first development is interesting in itself,
the second makes it even more so, and reinforces my comments about the
format for judicial reasons constituting a distinctive institutional product.
22. Including Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Puerto Rico, with ten judges.
23. The largest of all the circuits, comprising California, Arizona, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Oregon,
Washington state, Alaska and Hawaii, with twenty-eight judges.
24. From the Supreme Court's own statistics, it might look like my "more than half' overstates the
case; but the Supreme Court's actually counted category is "cases unanimous as to outcome" which
excludes cases where the differences dividing the judges are expressed in separate concurrences rather
than dissents. For a discussion of the practices and conventions surrounding the Canadian Supreme
Court's use of concurring reasons, see Peter McCormick, "Standing Apart: Separate Concurrence and
the Modem Supreme Court of Canada, 1984-2006" (2008) 53 McGill L.J. 137.
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There are six essential features to this new minority writing style.
These are:
First:
Minority reasons are written in the full consciousness of being
minority reasons. They are typically not "stand alone" reasons
that can be read on their own, but the self-conscious reasons
of a single judge or of a minority of the panel, appended to
the majority reasons in an explicit and self-conscious way. In
contrast, in seriatim style all the reasons look much the same,
and the minority judges do not realize they are dissenting (or at
least do not display any overt sign of such a realization) in the
way that they structure and present their reasons.
Second. Minority reasons concede the logical primacy and priority of
the majority reasons. The language actually suggests temporal
priority, ("I have read the reasons of Justice X") but since
most disagreement presumably emerges at the conference
immediately after oral argument when the majority reasons are
assigned to a particular judge, this should not be taken literally.
The clear implication is that we too should read the reasons of
Justice X first, before looking at the message of these minority
reasons. This acknowledgment is the first distinctive element of
modem minority reasons, and it has a further advantage: since
the Supreme Court Reports long retained the old practice of
listing the reasons in the order of the seniority of the writing
judge (rather than the more functional sequencing of judgment,
concurrences, and dissents), it is the verbal formula that alerts us
to the fact that reading the first set of reasons does not necessarily
mean that we are reading the judgment of the Court, even if
the format initially gives this impression. Only in 2005 did the
Court alter this practice to present the majority reasons first.
Third:

Minority reasons express "respect" or "deference" or "regret"
for their differences from the majority reasons. Again, this is
presumably more a matter of formality than candour-Supreme
Court justices are proud and confident professionals, and we can
be sure that what they really regret is the fact that their colleagues
were unwilling to sign on with them-but these formalities are
an important part of the presentation process. And it does
show something that the polite language can almost make us
overlook-there is something inherently confrontational, even
subtly subversive of the process itself, in the act of disagreeing
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formally and publicly with one's colleagues in general and with
the putative author in particular. 2 This expression of courtesy is
the second standard element of modem minority reasons.
Fourth: Minority reasons locate themselves by their opposition to a
specific aspect of the majority reasons. The typical wording of
this third element of modem minority reasons is: "I cannot agree
with respect to X" where X is a specific point of law or question
of interpretation. Not only do minority reasons typically yield
pride of place to the minority reasons, but they usually indicate
the part of the larger majority reasons to which their arguments
should be appended (and thereby implicitly accept, or at least do
not explicitly reject, the rest of it).
Fifth:

Minority reasons accept their secondary nature by being shorter,
typically much shorter. The shorter length is double-caused:
first by the fact that the minority reasons need only respond to
the analysis and not to the other elements of the reasons; and
second by the fact that usually they focus on a sub-set of the
issues and ideas dealt with in the reasons. Since there are some
spectacularly long minority reasons, this assertion may seem a
little curious; but most of the really long minority reasons result
from a vote swing within the panel-the (long) reasons that started
as majority reasons lost signatures, and the (shorter) reasons that
were initially drafted along the lines I have just been describing
became the judgment of the Court.2 6 In a real sense, then, these
"swing" decisions confirm rather than compromise the reasonwriting practices that I have identified as characterizing the
modem Supreme Court.

Sixth:

The traditional discussion of precedent would have it that only
majority reasons survive to steer the law, and minority reasons
are at best "losers' history," such that it would seem that this
distinctive style is a solid invitation to be ignored. But in fact
the ideas expressed in minority reason remain "in play" as part

25. "Putative" because I assume that the reasons of the majority, although formally assigned to
(usually) a single lead author, are in fact influenced by all the members of the panel; the appearance of
solo authorship should not be taken literally.
26. See Peter McCormick, "'Was It Something I Said?'-Losing the Majority on the Supreme Court
of Canada 1984-2007" (Paper presented to the 2008 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 2008), online: <http://allacademic.com//meta/pmlaapa_
research citation/2/6/6/l/2/pages266 12 l/p2 6 6 12 l-l.php>.
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of the judicial repertoire; about one-tenth of the Lamer Court's
citations to its own earlier decisions were citations of minority
reasons, 27 and although this practice has diminished somewhat
more recently, it has not vanished.
To be sure, my summary oversimplifies, because the development of
the various elements of this new minority style has been gradual and is not
completely uniform. Some judges are less likely than others to structure
their disagreement around such formal politeness; more intriguing, there
are some pairings of judges that are far more likely to generate (for
example) the respect terms on the occasion of disagreement, and others
where it never appears. But the point remains that there is a distinctive and
recurrent pattern and style to the Supreme Court's minority reasons, an
explicit way of connecting themselves to the judgment of the Court.
The combination of these two developments gives us a presentation
style for Supreme Court decisions that is clearly a distinctive institutional
product. The majority reasons take a specific form, carefully including a
string of basic elements in a formal and labelled way; the minority reasons
acknowledge themselves as such, and respectfully position themselves by
giving focused consideration to one or two points of disagreement. And
this disagreement is sometimes carried along with the Court's subsequent
consideration of the case, cited and discussed (in positive rather than
negative terms) far more often than the traditional doctrine of staredecisis
might have led us to expect.
VII. Fine-tuningformats
It would be a mistake to think about the way that an appeal court presents
itself and its decisions as something secondary or epiphenomenal, some
casual by-product of the interplay of a specific set of individuals serving
on the bench at any given time, or something absent-mindedly copied from
their predecessors. On the contrary, courts and judges often collectively
consider what they are doing and how best to do it, as is demonstrated by

28
those occasions when they change their presentation style very abruptly.

To move from specific examples to the general principle, academics have
suggested that there are specific demands that judges try to balance in a
shifting social context, and this periodically calls for a dramatic readjustment
27. See Peter McCormick, "Second Thoughts: Supreme Court Citation of Dissents and Separate
Concurrences, 1949-1999" (2002) 81 Can. Bar. Rev. 369.
28. The best documented common law example is the move away from seriatim style. For England,
see M. Todd Henderson, "From Seriatim to Dissensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent" [2007]
Sup. Ct. Rev. 283 [Henderson]. For the USSC under John Marshall, see Orth, supra note 2. For the
SCC, see L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 3.
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of the way that the court presents itself Henderson suggests that courts
are trying simultaneously to pursue the long-term projects of (expansively)
"increasing the power of law courts over other forms of dispute resolution"
and (defensively) protecting itself from social and political forces that
would contain or constrict that power.29 Popkin thinks that their dual
project is (externally to the legal profession) to "project judicial authority
to the external public" and (internally to the legal profession) to "apply
the law to decide cases (especially to adapt to change)," and adds that
these external and internal goals are often in tension.3" Lasser sees them
as striking a balance between mechanical application ("following the rules
laid down") and purposive policy considerations. 3'
And Dorf speaks of a "tension between the concrete and the. abstract"
that inevitably. lies "at the heart" of judicial power.32 For all four,33 the
courts have long-term goals pursued through changing circumstances
that call for evolving strategies, a process that Henderson describes as
"punctuated equilibrium."
Certainly there is no question about the "changing social circumstances"
within which the Supreme Court of Canada has found itself over the last
forty years. First, there was a dramatic transformation of the entire Canadian
court system during the 1970s-the replacement of Magistrates Courts
with Provincial Courts (with their own Chief Judge); the "consolidation
movement" that replaced the two-tier s. 96 trial courts in most provinces
with a single trial court, usually but not invariably styled the Court of
Queen's Bench; the establishment of free-standing specialized courts of
appeal in all the provinces; and the establishment of judicial councils
(initially at the national level, but progressively in all the provinces as
well) to enhance the nonpartisan elements of judicial appointment and to
solidify the practices surrounding judicial independence. For the Supreme
Court itself, the Trudeau/Turner reforms transformed the credentials of
a typical judge, with a greater emphasis on academic credentials and
appellate judicial experience, on public service rather than partisan

29. Henderson, ibid.
30. John Bell, FrenchLegal Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
31. Lasser, supra note 7 at ch. 2 and 6.
32. Michael C. Dorf, "Dicta and Article lI" (1993)-1994) 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997.
33. To be sure, they are pursuing quite different points as they identify these double imperatives.
Henderson's focus is the fall and more recent rise in the frequency of minority opinions; Popkin's
attention is directed more to the style and tone of judicial reasons (majority and minority alike);
Lasser wishes to compare civilian and common law judicial deliberations and decisions; and Dorf is
exploring whether the use of obiter dicta has allowed U.S. courts to find a way around the apparent
ban on advisory opinions on those occasions when it is useful to do so; but all suggest a strategically
directed balancing act that generates different answers at different times, and that is my point.
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connections, and on a diversity of personal backgrounds.34 There were
also important institutional changes to contain a burgeoning caseload,
including the creation of a two-tier Federal Court to replace the single-tier
Exchequer Court, and a dramatically increased leave jurisdiction that gave
the Supreme Court greatly enhanced control over its own docket.35
This restructuring of the Canadian court system in general and the
Supreme Court in particular was followed up by an even more significant
event: the entrenchment of the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms
in 1982. Once this was in place, once litigant and lawyers began to
understand its potential, and (perhaps most surprising of all) once Canadian
judges began to demonstrate that they were taking that potential very
seriously indeed (in stark contrast to the way that the statutory Canadian
Bill of Rights had been effectively strangled at birth3 6), this necessarily
involved the Supreme Court in a much wider range of legislative measures
and policy issues including the most controversial. The combination of
these two developments meant a complete transformation of the Court and
its public role, such that very few of the judges from the 1960s would have
been comfortable on the Court twenty-five years later, and vice versa.
I suggest that we should see the Court's new format as a response to these
new challenges. I have been describing the reasons delivered by the judges
of the Supreme Court, but there is of course a second set of considerations
in describing how the Court presents itself, these involving the standard
textual frame within which those reasons appear in the Supreme Court
Reports-and this frame has also been evolving. These reasons have always
included the style of cause identifying the appellant and the respondent,
the date of the hearing and of the decision, the judges in the panel, the
head-notes, a summary of the case, the full text of the reasons, and a list
of the participating attorneys at the end.37 More recently, however, it has
become considerably more elaborate. The summary no longer (as it once
did) provides the basic arguments of the parties, but focuses specifically
on the reasons of the judges. Since the 1960s it has consistently included a
list of all judicial authority cited, and of all statutes cited; since the 1980s
34. More bluntly: of people other than late-middle-aged white males of British or French descent.
35. It is also significant that during the 1960s, the Court had moved toward a regular judicial
conference after oral argument, rather than the earlier practice of "listen and run."
36. On the one hand, since the Bill of Rights said that Canadians already enjoyed the listed rights,
one interpretive stance was to conclude that it was not intended to create anything new or to alter
existing legislative provisions; on the other hand, since later statutes prevail over earlier statutes,
neither could it invalidate subsequent Acts of Parliament. The combination of the two approaches left
little opportunity for a Bill of Rights jurisprudence to develop.
37. Although only since 1980 have head-notes displayed the length, and the terminological
consistency, we now take for granted; before 1980, they were much briefer, much more uneven.

Structures of Judgment: How the Modern Supreme Court
of Canada Organizes its Reasons

61

it has included a list of all scholarly material (academic books and journal
articles, as well as references to the proceedings of Parliament and its
committees, and official reports of various kinds); and since 2005 it has
included a separate list of international materials cited. (And, curiously,
all participating lawyers are now listed twice, once at the beginning and
once at the end.) At the same time, the Court has followed a developing
pattern in its use of the two official languages, best described by Scassa.35
None of this was accidental; all of it has to be seen as an ongoing attempt
to restructure the way that the Court presented itself to a new and larger
audience as it dealt with new and broader and more controversial issues.
I suggest that we should similarly see the Court's new decisiondelivery format as a response to these new challenges; and that we should
do so in a comparative manner not because there is a single ahistorically
correct way of presenting decisions on which all common law appeal
courts are inexorably converging, but rather because all are dealing with
the challenges of a more attentive public in an age of judicial power. In
these terms, we can say that the Supreme Court of Canada has developed
a unique presentation format for its decision, and one whose advantages
(and therefore, arguably, whose implicit intentions) can be specifically
identified.
First, the SCC format permits the easy identification of the set of
reasons that carries the authority of the Court and that makes the clearest
and most unambiguous contribution to precedent.3 9 In the actual text of
the reasons themselves, there is (almost always) one set of reasons that is
identified as "the judgment of [A, B, C, and D] was delivered by: A," with
minority reasons simply as "the reasonsof [E and F] were delivered by: E."
(emphasis added) And if this were not enough, the Supreme Court has since
the beginning of 2005 indicated right up front, after listing the members of
the panel and before even beginning the summary, who delivered (and who
joined) the "Reasons for Judgment" as well as which of their colleagues
wrote or signed dissents or concurrences. From my limited survey, only
the Supreme Court of the United States does likewise, with the last section
of the Syllabus unambiguously designating which Justice has delivered
38. Teresa Scassa, "Language of Judgment and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1994) 43 U.N.B.L.J.
169.
39. 1 appreciate that this wording is "softer" than some might prefer, but I think it reflects the fact
that the Supreme Court of Canada not infrequently cites minority reasons (often to appropriate, not to
condemn, some of their ideas), and that it has on occasion changed its mind quite dramatically. The
most recent example is Health Services and Support-FacilitiesSubsector BargainingAssociation
v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, which explicitly and in so many words rejected the twenty-year
old precedent of the Labour Trilogy (the reasons "do not withstand principled scrutiny"), favourably
quoting from Dickson's dissent in that case.
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"the opinion of the Court." (emphasis added-"opinion" carrying the same
meaning for the USSC as "judgment" does for the SCC) On the USSC
web-page, the Opinion of the Court is identified again by always being the
on the far left side of the horizontal list. For most of the period considered,
this had no counterpart for the Supreme Court of Canada, where the first
full-text set of reasons was not necessarily the judgment, but rather that
delivered by the most senior justice 40 ; only since 2005 have the reasons
that constitute the judgment of the Court been presented first.
But the English and Australian high courts employ no similar devicemajority reasons and minority positions are presented in precisely parallel
ways. When the decisions are unanimous (which may mean single
sentence "I concur" opinions from all the judges but one, or in Australia a
joint decision coauthored by every member of the panel), this is obviously
not a problem, nor does a solo minority opinion or two create much doubt.
But the lack of transparency can be mildly problematic; consider, for
example, the HCA decision in Klein v. Ministerfor Education 2007 HCA
2, where Kirby has written by far the longest (and the only segmented)
set of reasons, but it is only in the middle of paragraph 6 of those reasons
("I disagree") that there is any indication that his is a dissent, followed
separately by the chief justice. This is, one should note, the historical and
traditional way of presenting decisions by appellate panels; the seriatim
tradition provides an outcome accompanied by a conversation between
several judges about the relevant law, and it is only afterward (if ever) that
it becomes clear which set of reasons was the most important for what
purposes.4 '
Second, the full format provides a "check list" both for those who
write Supreme Court decisions and those who read them. For example:
those who compile statistical data-bases of various kinds based on Supreme
Court decisions have a much easier time of it since the Lamer format took
hold than they did before. If you want to know whether the appealed-from
provincial court of appeal allowed or dismissed the case in question, or if
it divided on the question, or which judge wrote the reasons, this is very
40. A further complication is that USSC justices routinely write or sign more than one set of reasons
in each case; this is not unheard of on the SCC, but it is much more unusual.
41. "[T]he actual precedential value of a decision could be determined only by stitching together the
reasoning of the judges in the majority...What became precedent under these circumstances depended
on what subsequent justices calculated had been done in earlier series of opinions. There was, in effect,
no precedent until a later majority declared what it was." Michael J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 62. See also Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith &
Antonio Tomarchio, "Warren Court Precedents in the Rehnquist Court" (2007) 24 Const. Commentary
3 at 4: "However, the meaning of a precedent over time is not constant but is an 'iterative process' in
which the Court applies and modifies its meaning."
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much hit-and-miss (and usually miss) before the mid-1980s; now, there is
invariably a (sometimes very brief) summary of what happened, as well as
the law report citations for both that decision and the original trial. On the
down side, this probably contributes to longer decisions, in that there are
more "containers" calling for at least some minimal content.
At least in my opinion, this contributes to a more satisfactory mode of
explanation. Earlier decisions may be shorter, but they have the feeling of
giving an outcome-plus-reasons which mentions only those facts bearing
directly on that package. But the current format has the appearance of
presenting a neutral free-standing description of the factual and lower
court background which then proceeds to a consideration of the issues on
appeal. To be sure, a recital of facts can never be completely neutral-as we
discover on those unusual occasions when two members of the panel write
structurally parallel sets of reasons and reach different outcomesa2-but the
segmented separation of the two elements is highly functional.
Third, the structuring of the majority and minority opinions represents
an institutional project that embraces even divided opinions. The minority
reasons concede temporal and logical primacy to the majority ("have
read the reasons"), bow politely ("but, with respect, cannot agree"), and
then confine themselves to addressing only the most focused elements of
-the majority reasons ("with regard to [issue X]"). The minority reasons
usually cannot be read separately, but only make sense against the
shared background that has to be found in the majority reasons. Such an
approach stylistically reinforces rather than undermines the authority of
the majority reasons-a neat trick, considering the unavoidably subversive
core of public disagreement-even while it keeps "in play" a set of critical
alternative ideas. On those occasions when the format fails-Amselem cited
above is an example of two different judges writing their own set of freestanding reasons to reach opposite conclusions-the effect is quite striking,
but such failures are relatively infrequent. 43 The overall effect is a style
that includes minority opinions as part of an ongoing conversation (albeit
with an explicitly subordinate status), rather than marginalizing them as
"loser's history." Conversely, the minority opinions almost invariably
present themselves as part of this politely dispassionate conversation,
focussing on a specific part of the larger analysis, rather than emulating the

42.
43.

An excellent example is Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47.
On my count, they average only between two and three per term.
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grenade-lobbing rhetoric of the current USSC. 4 Thirty years ago, Redden
suggested that we should understand common law judicial decisions as the
combination of four dialogues-with the parties (by specifically addressing
their arguments), with other members of the panel (through minority
reasons), with the past (through the citation of precedent), and with the
future (through explicit consideration of the implications of the ruling) 5 ;
the new Supreme Court format fully delivers on this second dialogue.
In the other Commonwealth courts, on the other hand, dissents are
never so labelled, and may or may not identify themselves in so many
words as rejecting the conclusions of a majority of their colleagues; and
the notion of a separate concurrence is functionally meaningless unless
there is a designated majority opinion with which one can partly but not
completely agree. There are decisions (once one cobbles together the votes
to identify the winner), and there are reasons (lots of sets of reasons), but
there is not an institutional product that packages these as a single and
collaborative intellectual product.
Fourth, the new format serves the Court's public education and
public accountability role in a very useful way. The giving of reasons is
an important part of the judicial role in the common law system; indeed,
since only the reasons (hardly the outcome) can serve as precedent, the
common law system is utterly dependent on written reasons.46 As the
Supreme Court itself has recently declared: "Reasons for judgment are
the primary mechanism by which judges account to the parties and to the
public for the decisions they render. '47 In itself, this does not take us very.
far-all of the appeal courts in my casual survey deploy discursive reasons
that can on occasion be very long. The logical extension of this point
is Lasser's observation that authored reasons are an important element
of the Anglo-American balance between simply following the rules laid
down, and adjusting those rules in the light of social context and social

44. Scalia is rightly credited with the most routinely confrontational of these minority offerings, but
he is not alone; recently, for example, Chief Justice Roberts dissented, describing the majority decision
as "misguided" and "fruitless" and "grossly premature," as demonstrating "egregious" overreaching
so as to create a "jurisdictionally quirky outpost," able neither to read the statute or to understand
the review system that the immediate case challenged. "If this is the most the Court can muster," he
scoffs, "the ice beneath its feet is thin indeed." (Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L. Ed. 2d.
41.) The Supreme Court of Canada, by way of contrast, never indulges in such rhetorical flourishes.
45. Bernard Rudden, "Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia" (1973-1974) 48 Tul.
L. Rev. 1010 at 1014-1019.
46. See e.g. Martin Shapiro, "The Giving Reasons Requirement" [1992] U. Chi. Legal F. 179;
Frederick Schauer "Giving Reasons" (1994-1995)47 Stan. L. Rev. 633.
47. R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 at para. 15, Binnie J.,
writing for a unanimous Court. The question
was revisited and the principle affirmed in the more recent case of R. v. Walker, 2008 SCC 34, Binnie
again writing for a unanimous Court.
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change. Even though we can be reasonably sure that the final result is at
least in part a negotiated product, Supreme Court decisions are presented
to us as having an author, a specific individual judge" who personally
accepts responsibility for those ideas. The same consideration works for
the judges who write minority reasons, again accepting responsibility for
certain ideas that they typically pursue across a string of cases; nor is it
implausible to suggest that judges also accept responsibility when they
sign on to the reasons of another rather than making their own nuanced
and differentiated contributions. 49 This makes problematic a practice
such as the Australian every-judge-on-the-panel joint-authorship, or the
Canadian "By the Court" decision in which a unanimous panel presents
reasons that are not attributed to any individual justice-something which
happens about 5% of the time. °
For any written communication, one must ask not only who is doing
the writing, but also who they are writing it for-that is to say, what is
the audience? At one time, it would have been unproblematic to suggest
that common law judges were writing for other judges and for lawyers.
Supreme Court of Canada decisions from the 1960s or before, for example,
are terse compact essays unrepentantly packed with technical language
and assuming a very considerable legal background; references to judicial
authority, for example, are usually treated as if the simple citation spoke
for itself, without any indication of what the important finding might
be. Indeed, as Popkin points out, common law decisions originally were
entirely oral (hence the fact that for the House of Lords, the reasons in
judicial decisions are still referred to as "speeches"), then were transcripts
based on notes taken during these oral presentations, and only later came
under the managed control of the court issuing the decisions.
But today, Canadian Supreme Court decisions are much more
discursive, much more intentionally expansive, aimed at an educated lay
audience that is of uncertain size but certainly reaches far outside the legal
profession. To be sure, this audience is much smaller than the Supreme
Court would like it to be-there is no indication that either the LexUM
site or the CANLII site draw very much in the way of traffic for the fulltext online decisions that they make available so promptly after they are
delivered-but the important thing is that this has become the reference
48. Or, on occasion, two or even three judges co-authoring a set of reasons, something which now
happens in about 10% of all reserved judgments.
49. That is: it is perfectly intelligible for a commentator to say "I am not surprised by the position
taken by Justice X, but I am disappointed that Justice Y simply chose to sign on to those reasons."
50. The practices of the USSC regarding "By the Court" (per coram) decisions are sufficiently
different that they are not caught by these comments.
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point, and the Supreme Court has adjusted both its format and its style to
make itself more accessible.5'
I had envisioned this as a Chief-Justice inspired experimentation with
a variety of formats in the mid-1980s (that is to say, the Dickson Court),
accompanied by some degree of shared reflection on the experiments,
culminating in a possibly informal but nonetheless collective decision
as to the one that best served their purposes. Empirical verification of
this plausible hypothesis is difficult, especially when it is only attempted
two decades later; and my indirect enquiries (through a number of the
justices' clerks) were less than encouraging-judges who would have been
part of such experiments and discussion have no recollection of any such
exchanges, nor were they conscious more recently of working with a
"standard format" (let alone a new one) for either judgments or minority
reasons. But even should this have been an example of spontaneous
ordering-the members of a new Court after an almost unprecedented
wave of replacements each deciding on their own to present their reasons
differently in the face of new challenges, gradually coalescing around a
shared style-rather than conscious deliberation, it does not in any sense
contradict my suggestions above about format serving function, and it
makes the persisting uniformity of a consistent formatting style all the
more impressive.52
Conclusion
Henderson used the term "punctuated equilibrium" to deal with format
and presentation issues, suggesting that there is a dominant style that
persists until changing circumstances render it problematic, such that a
new style emerges to meet the new challenges. On the basis of my casual
comparative survey, this seems to pitch the matter rather too high-in fact,
most common law high appellate courts have a repertoire that includes a
variety of alternative styles and formats, between which they oscillate in
an opportunistic fashion. This being the case, the emergence of a standard
format is in itself one of a number of possible responses to contextual
demands, changes in this format constituting a second level of response.
The Supreme Court of Canada has, in recent decades, evolved a unique
form of self-explanation, involving a standard format based on a fairly

51. It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court began in 1995 to publish its reasons with paragraph
numbers; for the increasing number of people who rely on websites rather than published volumes for
access to judicial decisions, this is an invaluable aid in citation, since html documents of any length
whatever generally constitute a single page such that giving the "page number" for a direct quotation
is meaningless.
52. And the suddenness and the completeness of the shift to the new format quite remarkable.
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extensive set of generically labelled segments. This represents the new
equilibrium between diverse demands and expectations; we can expect
it -to persist for some time, and we can anticipate that its significant
alteration would occur only as a response to some significant change in
its environment. In the meantime, we can watch to see (in this world of
extensive and unremitting national high court interaction) whether there
are any emulation effects in other countries.

